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Abstract
The air traffic control system is a vast network of people and necessary navigational equipment that ensures the safe operation of
commercial and private aircraft throughout the world. Air traffic controller service is responsible for area, approach and aerodrome
control. Aircraft fatal accident data for commercial jet airplanes between 1959 and 2008 show that 36% of the accidents happen in the
final approach and landing phase, possibly due to mechanical failure or human error resulting from poor communication between the pilot
and air traffic controller. This paper presents an integration of a radar system with a GPS-based Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
System (TCAS) for approach control separation between all instrument flight rules (IFR) flights and between IFR flights and visual flight
rules (VFR) flights operated as controlled flights. The integration is simulated using MATLAB. Results of the simulation show that
aircraft separation is easier and safer than relying only on an air traffic controller. We note, however, that the service of air traffic
controllers is still required for successful aerodrome control.
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Introduction
The air traffic control system is a vast network of people and necessary navigational equipment that ensures the safe
operation of commercial and private aircraft throughout the world. The International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) in
1965 mandated that air traffic controllers be responsible for area control, approach control and aerodrome control services.
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Area control is responsible for maintaining separation
between all instrument flight rules (IFR) flights. In order to
be operated on an IFR flight plan and fly under IFR, aircraft
must be equipped with suitable instrumentation and with
navigation equipment appropriate to the route to be flown.
Approach control is responsible for providing separation
between all IFR flights, and between IFR flights and visual
flight rules (VFR) flights for which ATC control has
accepted responsibility in the vicinity of an airport.
Arriving aircraft are followed by approach control once
they have been released by area control until they have
landed and cleared the runaway. When departing, aircraft
stay with approach control from the time they enter the
runway until they have been released to area control. The
aerodrome control gives advice and instructions to aircraft
taxiing, landing, taking off and flying within the aerodrome
traffic zone in order to achieve an orderly and expeditious
flow of air traffic, and to assist in preventing collisions
between aircraft and either other aircraft or obstructions on
the ground. Aerodrome control also assumes control of
aircraft, vehicles and personnel within the maneuvering
area.
An analysis of fatal aircraft accidents in commercial jet
airplanes occurring between 1959 and 2008 showed that
36% of accidents happened in the final approach and
landing phases of flight. Of on-board fatalities, 13%
occurred in the final approach phase and 12% during
landing, for a total of 25% occurring in a crucial final phase
of flight. For a graphical representation of this data, refer to
Figure 1, (Kebabjian, 2012). These accidents may have
been caused as a result of mechanical failure, human error
which resulted from poor communication between the pilot
and air traffic controller, or an error in the navigational
equipment.
This paper presents the integration of a radar system with
a GPS-based traffic alert and collision avoidance system
(TCAS) for approach control separation between all IFR
flights, and between IFR and VFR flights operated as either
arriving or departing controlled flights, in order to reduce
aircraft accidents.
In order to better model the effects of integration, the
authors integrated a radar system with GPS-based TCAS
for approach control separation using MATLAB. Results of
the simulation show that aircraft separation is easier and
safer than relying only on visual input from an air traffic
controller. We note, however, that the service of air traffic
controller is still required for successful flight operation,
especially for aerodrome control.
Related work will be discussed, followed by an
introduction and explanation of the use of MATLAB,
radar, TCAS, and automatic dependent surveillance (ADS),
along with the requirements and functionality of the
simulation. Future research opportunities will be presented,
as well.
Related Work
Air traffic control systems began with the automation of
simulator machines as a training tool for both trainees and
instructors. One of the earlier simulators is the Tower
Research Simulator (TRS); another that is widely used in air
traffic control simulation is the Total Airspace and Airport
Modeler (TAAM) (Sood & Wieland, 2003). TAAM was
developed by Preston Aviation Solutions in Australia.
However, Plaettner-Hochwarth, Zhao, & Robinson (2000)
reported that one of the major drawbacks of this software
was the price tag. In 1997, a single site license cost about
$350,000. In addition to its high price, TAAM was also
reported to lack stochastic options and coverage of all Air
Traffic Management (ATM) components. Dennis (2003)
conducted research using the Tactical Separation Assisted
Flight Environment (TSAFE), developed by Heinz
Erzberger, chief scientist for air traffic control at the
NASA Ames Research Center. TSAFE was developed
Figure 1. Accidents and fatalities by phase of flight.
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experimentally, with the goal of emulating controller
inference, typically consisting of complex heuristics and
intricate algorithms.
System Description and Functionality
There are many navigational aids which provide
direction or range for aircraft, including: non-directional
beacons (NDB), very high omni-directional range/instru-
ment landing systems (VOR/ILS), and radio detection and
ranging (radar) (Obiniyi & Bakare, 2009). For this research
project, a radar system was integrated with GPS-based
TCAS for approach control separation. In the following
sections, the major components of the system will be
briefly discussed.
Radar
Radar is one of many electronic navigation aids available,
but it is unique in that it provides the air traffic controller
with a comprehensive view of air traffic over a wide area,
and hence has assumed a crucial role in modern Air Traffic
Control (ATC) procedures, especially in busy airspaces and
particularly under positive control. ATC radar is capable of
carrying out the functions and roles of approach control and
terminal area control, with the added capability of extended
range using secondary surveillance radar (SSR) techniques
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2002). Radar
systems’ capabilities include use in the provision of air
traffic services which have a very high level of reliability,
availability and integrity with back-up facilities.
A radar system consists of a number of integrated
elements, including radar sensor(s), radar data, transmis-
sion lines, radar data processing systems, and radar
displays. Multi-radar systems, that is, systems utilizing
more than one radar sensor, have the capability to receive,
process and display, in an integrated manner, data from all
the connector sensors.
Radar is capable of integration with other automated
systems used in the provision of air traffic services (ATS),
and provides an appropriate level of automation with the
three objectives of improving the accuracy and timeliness
of data displayed to the controller, reducing controller
workload, and minimizing the need for verbal coordination
between adjacent control positions and ATC units. GPS-
based TCAS can also be integrated with radar systems.
Radar systems are capable of displaying safety-related
alerts and warnings, including conflict alerts, minimum safe
altitude warning, conflict prediction and unintentionally
duplicated SSR codes. Primary surveillance radar (PSR)
and SSR may be used either alone or in combination by
ATS in order to ensure adequate separation between
aircraft, provided reliable coverage exists in the area and
the probability of detection, determined by the accuracy
and the integrity of the radar system, is satisfactory.
Radar derived data that are available for display to the
controller include, as a minimum, radar position indica-
tions, radar map information, and SSR Mode A, Mode C,
and Mode S (when available). The radar systems also
provide a continuously updated presentation of radar
derived information and radar position indications.
Navigation guidance to aircraft in the form of specific
headings (known as vectoring) is provided by radar. When
vectoring an IFR flight, the radar controller issues
clearances such that the prescribed obstacle clearance will
exist at all times until the aircraft reaches the point where
pilot will resume his or her own navigation (Wolff, 2012).
TCAS and Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS)
The traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS) is
an aircraft collision avoidance system designed to reduce the
incidence of midair collisions between aircraft. Independent
of air traffic control, it monitors the airspace around an
aircraft for other aircraft equipped with a corresponding
active transponder, and warns pilots of the presence of other
aircraft which may present a midair collision (MAC) threat.
It is mandated by ICAO to be added to those aircraft having
MTOM (maximum take-off mass) over 5,700 kg (12,586
lbs) or authorized to carry more than 19 passengers. TCAS-
equipped aircraft "interrogate" all other aircraft within a
predetermined range of their position (at a carrier frequency
of 1030 MHz) and those aircraft reply (at 1090 MHz). This
interrogation-and-response cycle may occur several times
per second. Through this constant back-and-forth commu-
nication, the TCAS system builds a three dimensional map
of aircraft in the airspace, incorporating their bearing,
altitude and range. Then, by extrapolating current range
and altitude difference to anticipate future values, it
determines whether a potential collision threat exists. If
required, it automatically negotiates a mutual avoidance
maneuver between the two or more conflicting aircraft.
Current TCAS avoidance maneuvers are restricted to the
vertical plane only; that is, restricted to changes in altitude
and modification of climb/sink rates (Lufthansa Airlines,
2005). There may be instances where the lateral resolution
maneuvers suggested in this paper may be incorporated in
certain complex traffic conflict scenarios, such as an
approach control area between aircraft taking off or landing.
The first generation of collision avoidance technology is
TCAS I. It is less expensive but also less capable than the
modern TCAS II system. GPS-based TCAS (Bakare &
Sahalu, 2011), a technical upgrade to the TCAS II system
which is used in the proposed system, allows reverse logic
and increased total separation between aircraft both in
lateral and vertical aspects.
Automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) is a system
used in the air traffic system in which aircraft automatically
transmit, via a data link, data derived from on-board
navigation systems. ADS is an air/ground data link
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application. At a minimum, the data includes aircraft
identification and a three-dimensional position, but addi-
tional data may be provided as appropriate. In order to
improve accuracy and timeliness of the control of aircraft
on approach, GPS-based TCAS is synchronised with ADS
to provide optimum navigation and performance accuracy
and automatic data transmission without the need for wide
separation standards. The accuracy of approach control
separation is expected to be improved with the use of GPS-
based TCAS interfaced with ADS, by enabling precise
locating through the use of the Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS). This will provide an easy means of
monitoring and determining the position of aircraft.
Aircraft position information is sent in an ADS report to
ATC at a rate of at least once every 10 seconds. The report
consists of six basic pieces of information-latitude, long-
itude, altitude, speed, time and accuracy. This is managed,
organized, and formatted by the onboard flight manage-
ment system (Airbus, n.d.).
An ADS reporting agreement specifies what data
schedule the aircraft should use and when the report
should be sent. There are three types:
1. Periodic contracts: data is transferred or transmitted
at fixed repetitive rate.
2. Event contract: data is transmitted each time an event
specified by the control system occurs; these include
passing away point, speed change, route change, and
altitude change, among others.
3. Demand contract: data is to be sent each time a
request is made by the control system.
GPS-based TCAS, ADS and the NextGen system
The concept underlying NextGen is the transformation of
Air Traffic Control (ATC) from a ground-based radar
network to an aircraft and satellite-based system.
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is
the NextGen system (Duncan Aviation, 2013). ADS-B-
equipped aircraft will send their identification along with
speed and precise vertical and horizontal positions to the
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) constellation.
This information is instantly broadcast over the entire
GNSS network to other ADS-B equipped aircraft as well as
ADS-B ground stations at 1090 MHz. These stations then
pass the information along to ATC in real time.
GPS-based TCAS equipment which is capable of
processing ADS-B messages may use this information to
enhance the performance of TCAS, using techniques
known as "hybrid surveillance. This capability may be
incorporated into an upgrade of TCAS.
In the NextGen system, each aircraft has the capability of
obtaining real-time data about other aircraft in its vicinity,
significantly enhancing safety and efficiency, and directly
benefits pilots, controllers, airports, airlines, and the public.
Introduction to MATLAB
MATLAB is a high-performance language for technical
computing. It integrates computation, visualization, and the
programming environment (David, 2005). MATLAB is a
modern programming language environment with sophis-
ticated data structures; it contains built-in editing and
debugging tools and supports object-oriented program-
ming. These factors make MATLAB an excellent tool for
teaching and research.
MATLAB has many advantages compared to conven-
tional computer languages like C or FORTRAN for solving
technical problems. MATLAB is an interactive system
whose basic data element is an array that does not require
dimensioning. The software package has been commer-
cially available since 1984 and is now considered as a
standard tool at most universities and industries worldwide.
It has powerful built-in routines that enable a very wide
variety of computations. It also has easy-to-use graphics
commands that make the visualization of results immedi-
ately available.
Specific applications are collected in packages referred
to as toolboxes. There are toolboxes for signal processing,
symbolic computation, control theory, simulation, optimi-
zation, and several other fields of applied science and
engineering. Version 7.9.0.529 (R2009B) was used for this
research.
System Design
In the approach area, there are typically many aircraft;
some might be taking off while others are approaching to
land. At an extremely busy airport, it may be difficult for
the air traffic controller to maintain the minimum required
separation between all aircraft continuously. In order to
alleviate some of the resulting controller workload, the
proposed system utilizes GPS-based TCAS interfaced with
ADS and integrated with radar (Bakare & Sahalu, 2011).
See Figure 2 for a graphical representation.
It is assumed that radar coverage is total; that is, various
installations in a particular country are networked so
system coverage is complete, taking into consideration
radar capability of detecting aircraft within a range of 250
NM. Aircraft within range are detected and identified, and
aircraft under surveillance are continuously tracked. Radar
systems display their safety-related alerts and warnings,
including conflict alerts, minimum safe altitude warning,
and conflict prediction to air traffic controllers.
The surveillance and tracking capabilities of radar share
trajectory data with that of TCAS, and pilots are able to
utilize this information to avoid potential midair collisions.
GPS-based TCAS interfaced with ADS can allow for the
identification and three-dimensional position of the aircraft.
Aircraft equipped with TCAS receive squitter messages
transmitted by the transponder of the intruder aircraft
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(within a range of 14 or 20 NM). The transmission occurs
periodically at one second intervals, and intends to enable
its detection and identification. Through repetitive TCAS
interrogations, up to a combined total of 30 intruders can be
tracked at any one time.
In an aircraft equipped with transponders, TCAS is
active and transmits pulses. Aircraft under surveillance are
tracked continuously, with a nominal time interval of one
second between interrogations. If another aircraft comes
within a specified distance, decisions about avoidance
maneuvers are determined and issued appropriately. A
coordination procedure is initiated between the two aircraft,
after taking into consideration the vertical status (altitude)
of the aircraft, its sensitivity level, and maximum speed.
TCAS issues preventive traffic advisory (TA) or horizontal
corrective resolution advisories (RA), as the case may be.
This system is simulated using MATLAB as shown in
Figure 3.
Aircraft Simulation in Different Altitude Modes for
Approach Control Separation
In the approach control area, many different operations are
conducted simultaneously. Some aircraft are taking off and
changing altitude rapidly, while those in the landing queue
are separated vertically by at least 1,000 feet. GPS-based
TCAS ensures strict compliance to reduced vertical separa-
tion minimums (RVSM) of 1,000 ft to allow for adequate
aircraft separation. For instance, lateral resolution maneuvers
could be issued to Aircraft B (while approaching to land) and
Aircraft A (taking off). Consider the following scenario:
Aircraft A takes off from a destination with longitude
7.545750 and latitude 10.769100, with a cruising speed of
240 km/hr selected. Meanwhile, Aircraft B is on approach,
with longitude 7.605770 and latitude 10.889200 (see Fig. 3).
It can be assumed that Aircraft B is going to land
approximately where Aircraft A took off, and that the two
aircraft are at different altitudes. Because of the continuous
availability of current trajectory data received from GPS, as
shown in the server console in Figure 3, corrective lateral
resolution advisories can be issued for both aircraft.
Because Aircraft B (descending) cannot instantaneously
gain full power to climb and Aircraft A (ascending) cannot
instantaneously climb higher or descend, TCAS issues a
corrective lateral RA (within 34 seconds) when the intruder
range is considered dangerous at the closet point of
approach (CPA), against a standard of 30 seconds (see
Table 1).
Figure 2. Approach control separation system flow.
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Simulation Results
In the simulation, after the aircraft were detected and
identified, they were placed under surveillance and
continuously tracked/interrogated in order to ascertain the
required parameters. The radar system gave altitude
warnings, while TCAS gave preventive traffic advisories
(TA) within 43 seconds. Corrective lateral resolution
advisories (RA) were given within 34 seconds when the
intruder range was considered dangerous at the closet point
of approach (CPA).
The time delay to carry out separation in the approach
area was less using an integrated radar and GPS-based
TCAS than using an air traffic controller alone, because the
information from the GPS satellite about current time, date,
and position was displayed continuously (every second)
(Wickens, 1999). The system used these trajectory data to
monitor the airspace around an aircraft for other aircraft
equipped with a corresponding active system and warn
pilots of the presence of those aircraft. The system allowed
a reduced traffic separation in the terminal areas and moved
part of the responsibility of separation from the controller
to the pilot to enhance safety. This does not relieve the need
for an air traffic controller, but could help to minimize
reaction time during periods of high workload.
Future Work
Future extensions of this work are possible. For instance,
there is a need to develop techniques that combine
symbolic representation of timing information with sym-
bolic representation of approach control locations. Also,
this work could be extended to allow for the possibility of
integration of TCAS and the ground proximity warning
system, GPWS.
Conclusion
Using MATLAB simulations, the radar system was
integrated with GPS-based TCAS for approach control
separation. Results of the simulation showed that aircraft
separation after integration is easier and safer than relying
only on air traffic controllers. The system gave altitude
warnings between aircraft, and successfully discriminated
between preventive traffic advisories and corrective lateral
resolution advisory when the intruder range or altitude was
Figure 3. MATLAB display during simulation.
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considered dangerous. It should be noted, however, that the
service of an air traffic controller is still required for
successful landings, and especially for aerodrome control.
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Table 1
Results of Aircraft Simulation in Different Altitude Modes
Aircraft A Aircraft B
Distance Apart (nm) TAU (Second) Resolution System PerformanceLong. (Deg) Lat. (Deg) Long. (Deg) Lat. (Deg)
7.43 10.55 7.72 11.11 37.86 567.9 — No Traffic
7.44 10.55 7.72 11.11 37.65 564.81 — —
7.44 10.56 7.71 11.1 36.01 540.13 — —
7.55 10.78 7.6 10.88 6.59 98.9 — —
7.55 10.78 7.6 10.88 6.39 95.81 — —
7.55 10.78 7.6 10.87 5.98 89.64 — —
7.55 10.79 7.6 10.87 5.56 83.47 — —
7.56 10.79 7.6 10.87 5.36 80.38 — —
7.56 10.79 7.6 10.87 5.15 77.3 — —
7.56 10.79 7.59 10.87 4.95 74.21 — —
7.56 10.79 7.59 10.86 4.74 71.13 — —
7.56 10.8 7.59 10.86 4.54 68.04 — Detection
7.56 10.8 7.59 10.86 4.33 64.96 — —
7.56 10.8 7.59 10.86 4.12 61.87 — —
7.56 10.8 7.59 10.86 3.92 58.78 — —
7.56 10.8 7.59 10.86 3.51 52.61 — —
7.56 10.8 7.59 10.85 3.3 49.53 — —
7.56 10.81 7.59 10.85 3.1 46.44 TA Traffic
7.56 10.81 7.59 10.85 2.89 43.36 TA Traffic
7.57 10.81 7.59 10.85 2.68 40.27 TA Traffic
7.57 10.81 7.59 10.85 2.48 37.19 — —
7.57 10.81 7.58 10.85 2.27 34.1 RA Collision
7.57 10.81 7.58 10.84 2.07 31.02 RA Collision
7.57 10.82 7.58 10.84 1.86 27.93 RA Reverse
7.57 10.82 7.58 10.84 1.66 24.84 — —
7.57 10.82 7.58 10.84 1.45 21.76 — —
7.57 10.82 7.58 10.84 1.24 18.67 — —
7.57 10.82 7.58 10.84 1.04 15.59 — —
7.57 10.82 7.58 10.84 0.83 12.5 — —
7.57 10.82 7.58 10.83 0.63 9.42 — —
7.57 10.83 7.58 10.83 0.42 6.33 — —
7.57 10.83 7.58 10.83 0.22 3.25 — No Traffic
7.58 10.83 7.58 10.83 0.01 0.16 — No Traffic
7.58 10.83 7.58 10.83 0.2 2.93 — No Traffic
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